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In  recent  years, t he de velopment o f t he i dea o f “ Open 
Innovation”(Chesbrough, 2004; 2006) lead to the emergence of “Innovation 
brokers” who connect those seeking for solutions with a rather large number of 
potential knowledge suppliers. In this paper we analyze the implication that 
the e xistence of  s uch  Innovation br okers h as on ot her or ganizational 
interchanges f irms m ay en gage i n.  Specifically,  we  ask  how t he i nter-
organizational network of a particular firm evolves over time if they use an 
Innovation broker or not. Apart from contributing to both, network theory by 
shedding light on t he evolution of network ties, and the innovation literature 
by adding to our understanding of how knowledge flows develop over time, 
our work should also have rather practical implications for Innovation brokers 
themselves and for their clients. 
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In recent years, the term “Open Innovation” has become an increasingly popular description for 
an emerging paradigm that suggests that firms move away from a closed, protective and firm 
centered innovation system towards a model that embraces the potential of joint innovation or at 
least e xtensive know ledge i nterchanges w ith ot her or ganizations ( e.g., C hesbrough, 2004, 
2006a,b). The general idea is that firms can enhance their innovative performance by importing 
knowledge from firm external sources (such as suppliers, customers or universities; e.g., Laursen 
and S alter, 2004, 2006)  a nd f urther be nefit f inancially b y s elling t o ot her f irms i nternally 
generated “surplus” innovations (i.e., ideas that cannot b e usefully  applied within the firm’s 
current business model; e.g., Lichtenthaler, 2006, 2007). 
Based on t hese general ideas, a number of inter-organizational developments can be observed 
recently. On one hand, firms attempt to spin “Innovation nets” around themselves in order to 
bind a variety of potential suppliers of ideas to themselves. On the other hand, third parties 
attempt to become “Innovation brokers” who connect those seeking for solutions with a rather 
large number of potential knowledge suppliers. This latter phenomenon, exemplified by new 
companies such as InnoCentive (Allio, 2004), constitutes a near-perfect “structural hole” as we 
know i t f rom ne twork l iterature  (Burt, 1992) .  In f act, b y  focusing s olely on  exploiting t he 
informational a dvantage of  c onnecting t wo or  m ore a ctors w ho do  not ha ve  direct tie s, 
innovation brokers purely  benefit from the information (and to some extent also the power) 
advantage of being a structural hole – they do n ot, however, benefit from the ties in any more 
direct way, as, for example, firms in a network of alliances would. In this paper we analyze the 
implication t hat t he e xistence of  s uch  Innovation br okers ha s on  ot her or ganizational 
interchanges f irms m ay en gage i n.  Specifically, w e as k  how doe s t he i nter-organizational 
network of a particular firm evolve over time if they use an Innovation broker or not. Apart from 
contributing to both, network theory by shedding light on t he evolution of network ties, rather 
than just looking at static comparisons of various network types, and the innovation literature by 
adding to our understanding of how knowledge flows develop over time, our work should also 
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LITERATURE & THEORY 
 
 
A number of high profile firms such as Procter & Gamble (P&G), Philips, IBM, Nokia or Endesa 
have a lready e mbraced t he i dea ( e.g., H uston &  S akkab, 20 06; ow n i nterviews; 
www.cide.endesa.es) that a high degree of “openness” can help shorten innovation lags, provide 
overall new ideas, or help to cover own R&D expenses. Some of these firms have created rather 
explicit new organizational structures to aid them in particular in reaching out to other entities 
that could be sources of new ideas. Endesa, a leading Spanish power company, for example, has 
created a n i nnovation ne twork t hat br ings t ogether m ore t han 50 w orld r enowned hi gh 
technology firms (among them IBM, Siemens, Alcatel-Lucent, etc.) that are interested in a closer 
cooperation with Endesa. These partner firms pay an annual fee on t he order of several ten 
thousand Euro to benefit from the various events that Endesa sponsors within this network. In 
addition t o a n  annual i nnovation c ongress, E ndesa  also s hares a  hos t of  i n-depth  technical 
information on its own innovation status and particularly its innovation needs for the future. If 
any of the partner firms recognizes an opportunity to solve any of Endesa’s specific problems, a 
bilateral innovation project is started (own interview with Endesa). This is an example of a firm 
centered innovation network that leads to the development of comparatively strong ties between 
the firm in the center and the potential suppliers of knowledge. A somewhat different model is 
currently being developed by P&G, which, as Huston and Sakkab report in a series of articles 
and interviews (2006; RTM, 2007), has embraced open innovation ideas to such an extent that 
they already derive more than 50% of their innovation at least in part from knowledge or ideas 
developed outside of their firm boundaries. To achieve this, P&G has build up internal capacities 
at s potting va luable  external know ledge s ources b y de dicating a bout 70 pe rsons t o a  
“Technology Entrepreneurs Network” which actively s couts for new ideas, or bringing back 
retirees to once more aid P&G in development activities. The latter approach has even grown 
into a business called “YourEncore” that now creates a n etwork among retirees and  at least 15 
other firms. In addition to forming their own instruments, P&G is also actively using existing 
external Innovation Brokers like “Innocentive”, or “NineSigma”. 
It is these Innovation Brokers that form the focus of our paper. Dominating firms like P&G 
appear to be explicitly engaged in shaping the nature of the firm interaction that will ensue as IE Business School Working Paper               WP11-02                                   19/01/2011 
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more firms scramble to take advantage of the promises of open innovation. While P&G follows 
seemingly a strategy of mixing various approaches (creating own networks, having dedicated 
technology scouts, but also just being a “customer” of commercial innovation brokers), other 
large f irms, l ike E ndesa, a ppear t o be  t rying  to c reate m ore of   an e xclusive c lub a round 
themselves. What, however, should we expect of the average firm that wants to source outside 
knowledge? Will they become simple customers of innovation brokers and rely more or less 
completely on such arrangements, or will they likewise try to form their own networks (i.e., 
strong links with several other entities), perhaps even at the same time that they peruse brokers? 
Moreover, r ecent s tudies the orized  and  empirically d emonstrated  the i mportance tha t  firms’ 
interorganizational ne tworks ha ve f or t heir i nnovativeness ( Ahuja, 2000:  R eagans a nd 
Zuckerman, 2001;   Zaheer a nd  Bell, 2005) . O ur c onjecture i n t his pa per i s t hat a  f irm’s 
relationships w ith t he  innovation br okers w ill s ignificantly c hange i ts ne twork s tructure, 
particularly t he us e of  s trong a nd w eak t ies ( Granovetter, 1973) . T his w ill ha ppen a s  these 
innovation br okers w ill l ead t o a n i nstitutionalization of  t rust ( Zucker, 1986)  b y c arefully 
designing t he r ules of   exchange be tween pa rtners and  t hus t o  a d ecrease f or t he ne ed  for 
interorganizational t rust i n e xchange r elationships ( Ring a nd va n de  V en, 1994;  Z aheer, 
McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). This will decrease the search costs and firms will start to  reach 
distant parts of the network by weak ties that they create through these innovation brokers. As a 
result, we expect an initial decrease in the importance of existing strong ties. Later on,  as they 
discover ne w pa rtners, t hey m ay s trengthen s ome of  t hese r elationships, a nd c onsequently 
increase the number of strong ties. This cycle through the use of strong and weak ties will then 
likely be repeated over the long run. We explain these ideas further below.   
If a client firm can rely on one (or more) Innovation broker to always identify new suppliers of 
knowledge, a straightforward conjecture would be that it would not be of benefit to the client to 
maintain (or establish in the first place) its own network of strong ties to organizations that may 
have knowledge needed by the focal firm in the future. Behind this reasoning is a very simple 
cost-benefit c alculation  –  maintaining s trong t ies ha s t he a dvantage t hat t ransaction c osts 
(Williamson, 1975) of finding new exchange partners, contracting with them and then enforcing 
the contracts is minimized, as trust of repeated transactions reduces governance costs, and the 
search and contracting costs naturally fall away as the same partner is used over and over. In 
addition, ove r t ime, p artner-specific a bsorptive c apacity ( Dyer a nd  Singh,  1998;  Cohen &  IE Business School Working Paper               WP11-02                                   19/01/2011 
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Levinthal, 1990) is likely to emerge; i.e., as firms start to understand each other increasingly well 
(they  become a cquainted t o e ach ot hers know ledge ba ses,  communication s ystems, e tc.), 
learning and   technology a doption be tween t he  partners  are f acilitated. O n t he ot her h and, 
constantly dealing with the same set of exchange partners also has some costs – primarily, there 
is no guarantee that the existing partners have the best ideas or knowledge in any given context; 
here, a broader search would perhaps yield more valuable knowledge that is not available in an 
existing set of strong ties. In addition, as partners build up absorptive capacity with respect to the 
focal firm, the risk of leaking (too much) information into these “partner” firms increases with 
the strength and duration of the tie. 
Using a n i nnovation br oker, how ever, h as a   different  economic l ogic. O n one  h and, a n 
innovation broker can potentially generate a very large variety of external views on a problem 
which could result in rather well targeted, rather valuable knowledge to the client (in fact, firms 
like InnoCentive strongly advertise with examples where some outside inventors already had the 
solutions in  the drawer that client firms initially tried unsuccessfully to create in-house – see 
Allio, 2004). Furthermore, by keeping seekers and providers of knowledge anonymous until a 
deal has been reached, knowledge spillovers are minimized. Accordingly, 
 
H1: Client firms that work with innovation brokers will reduce the number of 
direct strong ties they have over time. 
However, as client firms start working with an innovation broker, they will also come into direct 
contact w ith p roviders of  know ledge s ince,  once t he br oker i dentifies a  m atch  between 
knowledge needs and a potential supplier, the two parties must be brought together to actually 
carry out an act of joint knowledge creation. In other words, knowledge needs posted with the 
innovation broker rarely will meet with “ready  made” solutions on t he supplier side; rather, 
suppliers with a potential ability to meet the posted requirements of the knowledge seeker may 
come f orward, a nd t he t wo pa rties t hen n eed t o j ointly w ork on  t he a ctual s olution 
(innocentive.com). S uch a  c ontact, i f s uccessful, w ould s eem t o be  l ikely t o  entice t he t wo 
entities (knowledge seeker and supplier) to consider working together again in the future, most 
likely without further moderation by the Innovation broker (particularly, since this would avoid 
the charges the innovation broker levies for its services). Accordingly: IE Business School Working Paper               WP11-02                                   19/01/2011 
E Business School Working Paper       WP10-04               09/07/2010 
5 
 
H2: Client firms that work with innovation brokers will increase the number of 
direct strong ties they have over time (the new strong ties being primarily entities 
introduced via the innovation broker). 
Accordingly, to the extent that firms develop such strong ties and focus much of their attention 
on working with a specific set of knowledge generation partners, they will likely feel a lower 
need of working with an innovation broker. Yet, over time, the problem of strong ties, i.e. a 
focus on a  na rrow s et of  pa rtners a nd t heir s pecific e xperience m ay l ead t o t oo m uch of a 
concentration on exploitation of existing ideas, rather than an exploration (March, 1991) of new 
areas. Thus, with time, firms may renew their interest in working with innovation brokers to 
benefit from the lager breadth of potential knowledge sources that these brokers offer access to. 
Hence: 
H3: If client firms subsequent to working with an innovation broker increase their 
strong ties, then their relationship with the innovation broker will fluctuate over 
time between strong and weak. 
Furthermore, as suggested above, innovation brokers offer access to a large variety of ideas that 
may form the basis for more exploratory knowledge generation in a focal firm: 
 
H4: Client firms that utilize and Innovation broker will engage in more 
exploration than other firms. 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
In order to empirically test our arguments, we will collect data from both the innovation brokers 
and the firms that participate and do not participate in open innovation systems. We will also use 
secondary data to map the alliance network.  
Our arguments suggest that we should test them over time. Since, the open innovation idea is 
fairly new, we would like to triangulate by also comparing the alliance networks of companies 
that participate in  open innovation systems with similar companies that do  not participate in 
them.  
In order to measure H1, we will compare the alliance networks of companies before and  after 
they participate in the open innovation systems. We should expect a decrease in the strong ties 
(measured by multiple alliances signed with the same company and whether the alliance involves IE Business School Working Paper               WP11-02                                   19/01/2011 
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equity o r not ) imme diately.  To  triangulate,  we w ill a lso c ompare  the al liance ne tworks of  
companies that participate and that do not participate in the open innovation systems.  
In order to measure H2, we will look at how many new alliances are signed before and after the 
companies participate in the open innovation systems. We will also compare the new alliance 
formation rate of companies that participate in and that do not  participate in open innovation 
systems.  
In order to test H3, we will compare the variance in strong versus weak tie ratio of the companies 
that participate in open innovation systems with the same ratio of the companies that do not  
participate.   
In order to test H4, we will compare the R&D to revenues ratio of companies before and after 
they participate in open innovation s ystems. We will also compare t he same ration  between 
companies that participate in open innovation systems and that do not.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In t his pa per, w e  argue t hat t he s uccess of  op en i nnovation br okers  will a lter t he ne twork 
structure of high technology firms. The major effects of these brokers will be to institutionalize 
trust at the network level and therefore lower the needs for interorganizational trust (Ring and 
van de Ven, 1994; Zucker, 1986; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). This change creates a 
favorable environment for exploration (March, 1991) in the short run and a freer hand to manage 
exploration and exploitation in the long run.  Firms that participate in t hese open innovation 
systems will have lower search costs with institutionalized trust and therefore will have an upper 
hand in overcoming local search and managing the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation 
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